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INTRODUCTION 
 
In 2004, the government introduced the Domestic Violence, Crime and 
Victims Act (DVCVA). Baroness Scotland, in opening the Bill’s second 
reading in the House of Lords, said: “The Bill represents the most radical 
overhaul of domestic violence legislation in 30 years. It reflects the fact that 
domestic violence is unacceptable, that victims must be protected and offenders 
punished.”1  
In broad terms, protection for victims is provided by introducing 
amendments to existing civil and criminal offences including extending police 
powers in making, both common assault and a breach of a non-molestation 
order, arrestable offences (section 10 and section 1); offering protection to a 
wider range of persons by including same-sex couples in the meaning of 
“cohabitants" (by amending Part 4 Family Law Act (FLA) 1996); including in 
the definition of “associated persons” same-sex couples (by amending Part 4 
FLA), and  perhaps of the greatest significance  creating an entirely new 
homicide offence of  “causing or allowing the death of a child or vulnerable 
adult” (section 5). There are several provisions intended to empower victims of 
domestic violence by allowing them a greater participation in the justice 
process, including the right to make representation in court (sections 35-46) 
and by providing additional support in the form of a Victim’s Code, although 
the remit of this code of practice is still yet to be determined (section 32). 
Finally, there is also a provision, which establishes independent investigations 
of domestic homicides termed “domestic homicide reviews” (section 9). This 
commentary considers to what extent the new legislation will assist in the 
protection of victims of domestic violence. 
 
∗ BA (CNAA), MA, PhD (Manc), LLM (Reading), Deputy Dean of Law, Professor of 
Law, University of Buckingham; Barrister, (Door Tenant) Clarendon Chambers, 1 
Plowden Buildings, Temple, London EC4Y 9BU. 
1Hansard, HL, col 949, December 15, 2003.  
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BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT  
 
The Act is a demonstration of the government’s wider commitment to 
provide enhanced protection for victims of domestic violence. Domestic 
violence homicide of adult partners continues to account for approximately 130 
victims each year since 19972 (whilst over the last three decades the number 
has been on average 110 victims each year). Domestic violence homicide 
remains largely a gender based crime. Of all adult female victims of homicide 
over the last decade (1995-2005) between 40-45 per cent were killed by current 
male partners or ex-partners.3  It is widely accepted that intervening at the 
earliest stage in this escalating chain of violence can have a significant impact 
in the prevention of domestic homicide. The rise in both recorded incidents and 
prosecutions for domestic assault reflects the increased commitment of police 
and prosecutors to record and prosecute in these cases. A total of 35,231 
prosecutions were recorded for the final eight months (April to December) of 
2005.4  For the Metropolitan Police District alone, the number of cases rose 
from 2,030 in 2004 to 3,272 in 2005.5 (It is worth noting, by way of 
comparison, that in 1985 as few as 384 cases of domestic violence were 
recorded by police).6 This increase in prosecutions has been aided by 
establishing specialist courts to hear these cases7 and by the collection and use 
of enhanced evidence gathering, including photographic evidence and witness 
statements. As part of this commitment, the Crown Prosecution Service is also 
considering whether expert witnesses8 might be of assistance in supporting 
prosecution cases where the complainant is hostile to the proceedings and 
whose witness statement controverts any testimony given in oral evidence.   
2 K Coleman, C Hird and D Povey, Violent Crime Overview, Homicide and Gun Crime 
2004/2005 (Supplementary Volume to Crime in England and Wales 2004/2005) 
(London: Home Office, January 26, 2006) Table 2.05 p. 58. Although it is to be noted 
that the Home Office Bulletin noted above records that domestic violence homicide as 
a proportion of all homicide has fallen, this is potentially misleading, since what has 
actually occurred is that an increase in homicides committed by strangers has merely 
impacted on the proportion of homicides that arise from domestic violence.  
3 See note 2 above p.50. 
4 The Independent,  March 9, 2006.  
5 The Evening Standard, March  8, 2006. 
6 See The Times, October 6, 1986.  See also S. Edwards, Policing Domestic Violence 
(London: Sage, 1989). 
7 M Hester, and N Westmarland, Tackling Domestic Violence: effective interventions 
and approaches, Home Office Research Study 290 (London: Home Office, 2005).  
8 M. M. Dempsey The Use of Expert Witness Testimony in the Prosecution of Domestic 
Violence (London: Crown Prosecution Service, 2004).  This document summarises a 
report drafted by Professor S Edwards (The Law School, University of Buckingham) 
regarding the use of expert witness testimony in the prosecution of domestic violence.  
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SENTENCING 
 
In addition, the sentencing practice of the courts in cases of domestic 
homicide and domestic assault demonstrates that sentencers are treating such 
offences more seriously than was the case in earlier years.  In December 2002, 
the Attorney General, referred three cases of domestic violence homicide  to 
the Court of Appeal with a view to encouraging judges to impose stiffer terms 
of imprisonment than had hitherto been the case.  In Suraton, Humes and 
Wilkinson [2002],9 whilst the Court of Appeal agreed that mere loss of temper 
or jealous rage is not sufficient to establish loss of self control, nevertheless it 
found that Suraton’s three and a half year sentence and Wilkinson’s four year 
sentence were not “unduly lenient”, and Humes seven-year sentence was not 
considered  “lenient” [sic]. In Suraton, Lord Justice Mantell stated:  
 
“Even if it would ever be sensible to attempt to lay down 
guidelines in this notoriously difficult area, we quite agree that 
it would be inappropriate for the Court [of Appeal] as presently 
constituted to do so or for any Court to do so without the 
Sentencing Advisory Panel having first been involved.”   
 
The Sentencing Advisory Panel commenting on this case said: 
 
 “…the court did not disagree with the proposition that in cases 
of manslaughter committed after provocation arising out of 
possessiveness, jealousy or unfaithfulness, the ordinary 
sentencing range lies between 5 and 7 years imprisonment.”10  
 
The Criminal Justice Act (CJA) of 2003 placed on a statutory basis the 
Sentencing Guidelines Council (SGC) whose role is to provide authoritative 
guidance on sentencing in criminal offences. By 2005, the SGC issued 
guidance on sentencing in manslaughter cases by reason of provocation, 
providing for three sentencing ranges depending on the degree of provocation. 
The first range has a starting point of three years imprisonment where the 
degree of provocation is high, the second range starts at eight years where there 
is a substantial degree of provocation over a short time and the third range 
starts at twelve years where there is a low degree of provocation.11 The CJA 
9 Attorney General's References (Nos 74, 95 and 118 of 2002)  [2003] Crim LR, 414. 
10 Sentencing Advisory Panel Manslaughter By Reason Of Provocation The Panel’s 
Advice To The Sentencing Guidelines Council (London: May 2005) p. 8. 
11 Manslaughter by Reason of Provocation Sentencing Guidelines Council, 28th 
November 2005.  Issued  a definitive guideline in accordance with section 170(9) of the 
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2003 also provides for longer sentences in all cases involving violence not 
resulting in death.12 By 2004, the Court of Appeal in R v Madar,13 a case of 
domestic assault, upheld a sentence of four years imprisonment for repeated 
acts of serious “domestic” violence.14  
With regard to the civil law, where there have been breaches of non-
molestation orders, the courts have also started to impose longer sentences. 
Although in Loughran v Pandya,15 the court reduced a two year sentence 
suspended for two years to that of eight months imprisonment suspended for 
two years.  
 
THE LIMITATIONS OF THE DVCVA  
 
Even with the advent of the DVCVA some issues relating to domestic 
violence have still been left unaddressed. For example, there is no definition of 
domestic violence provided in the Act. Lord Thomas of Gresford commented 
on this omission at the Bill stage:  
 
“It is curious to have it called Domestic Violence, Crime and 
Victims Bill, without anyone having a clear idea how far 
domestic violence extends; who may be parties to domestic 
violence; who may not be; what type of conduct is regarded as 
domestic violence and whether it covers psychological 
harm.”16  
 
The definition of domestic violence which is widely used is found in the 
Home Office in Domestic violence: a national report,17 which reads: “Any 
 
Criminal Justice Act 2003. Although it is to be noted that the SGC did not include 
previous acts of domestic violence by the defendant against the deceased as an 
aggravating factor. On this point it may be considered to be incongruent with  both the 
approach of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 to violence in general and  the Sentencing 
Guidelines Council Consultation Document on Domestic Violence 2006, where a 
history of violence is an aggravating factor. 
12 See sections  227, 228 and 229 Criminal Justice Act 2003. 
13 Court of Appeal, Criminal Division [2004] All ER (D) 91 (Sep); [2004] EWCA Crim 
1524. 
14 Criminal Justice Act 2003, section 327 “relevant sexual or violent offence” includes 
offences where a sentence of imprisonment of 12 months and above is imposed, 
relevant violent offence includes  section 18 Offences Against the Person Act  1861. 
15 Court of Appeal, Civil Division [2005] EWCA Civ 1720, (Transcript: Smith Bernal). 
16 Hansard, HL, col 1218,  March 9, 2004. See also House of Commons Research 
Papers: Research Paper 04/44 2004 The Domestic Violence, Crime and Victims Bill 
[HL]: Domestic violence provisions June 9, 2004. 
17 Domestic violence: a national report (London: Home Office, March 2005). 
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incident of threatening behaviour, violence or abuse (psychological, physical, 
sexual, financial or emotional) between adults who are or have been intimate 
partners or family members, regardless of gender or sexuality.”18 The Act also 
fails to offer all victims equal protection since the degree of protection is 
affected by legal differences in the relationship of the parties concerned.19 A 
distinction is made between the duration of an occupation order made in favour 
of a spouse and an order made in favour of a cohabitant.20   
Further, whilst it was the aspiration of many that the civil and criminal law 
justice systems and their responses to domestic violence would move towards 
being more integrated, the criminal courts are still not obliged to address what 
civil orders may be in process or even make enquiries about, for example, child 
contact or housing issues or to consider the views of the victim who will not be 
party to the proceedings. Thorpe LJ, had anticipated that the Act would better 
integrate the civil and criminal responses.  In Lomas and Parle (2004)21 he 
said: 
 
“[47] However effectively the proceedings are managed a 
perpetrator may face sentence for the same act which amounts 
to both a breach of an injunction made in family proceedings 
and also a crime under the 1997 Act. Of course the sentencing 
courts do not share the same objective and operate in different 
ranges. The judge in family proceedings has to fit a custodial 
sentence within a range of zero to 24 months. An important 
objective for him is to uphold the authority of the court by 
demonstrating that its orders cannot be flouted with impunity. 
Nevertheless there will be a shared deterrent objective in the 
punishment of domestic violence by imprisonment. [48] 
Clearly therefore the first court to sentence must not anticipate 
or allow for a likely future sentence. It is for the second court 
18 ibid para 10, p 7.  The CPS definition is drafted in almost identical terms, “any 
criminal offence arising out of physical, sexual, psychological, emotional or financial 
abuse by one person against a current or former partner in a close relationship, or 
against a current or former family member” Domestic Violence How Prosecution 
Decisions are Reached (London: Crown Prosecution Service 2005) and the Sentencing 
Guidelines Council guideline Manslaughter by reason of provocation defines domestic 
violence as  “any incident of threatening behaviour, violence, or abuse [psychological, 
physical, sexual, financial or emotional] between adults who are or have been intimate 
partners, regardless of gender or sexuality.” 
19 C Bessant  The Domestic Violence, Crime  and Victims Act 2004 : A Guide (London: 
The Law Society  2005) p 4. 
20  ibid above  p 5. 
21 [2004] 1 WLR 1643. 
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to sentence to reflect the prior sentence in its judgment in order 
to ensure that the defendant is not twice punished for the same 
act. It is essential that the second court should be fully 
informed of the factors and circumstances reflected in the first 
sentence. The defendant is often publicly funded to defend the 
proceedings in each court and may well have different 
solicitors and counsel in each justice system. There is therefore 
an obligation on the first court to ensure that the basis of its 
sentence is fully expressed and that a transcript of its judgment 
is made available to the second court, as Judge Harris directed 
in the present case. [49] Experience suggests that proceedings 
in the criminal justice system are likely to require more 
extensive preparation and to prove more protracted than 
committal proceedings in the family justice system. Therefore 
the application to commit should be issued promptly after the 
alleged breach and listed without delay. That discipline will 
ensure that, if proved, the contempt will have been punished 
before any sentence in parallel criminal proceedings.”22
 
EXTENDING CIVIL AND CRIMINAL PROTECTION  
 
Following Safety and Justice: the governments proposals on Domestic 
Violence,23 sections 2,3, and 4, of the DVCVA extends Part 4 of the FLA to 
non-cohabiting couples in a relationship. The meaning of “cohabitants” now 
include parties in same-sex relationships. In defining non-cohabiting 
relationships which fall within the Act, section 4 amends section 62(3) of the 
FLA (associated persons) adding sub section (ea) which requires the parties  to 
be or have been in “…an intimate personal relationship with each other which 
is or was of significant duration.” How the courts will interpret “intimate,” 
“personal” and “of significant duration” is yet to be determined. Some 
guidance is offered in the explanatory notes to the Bill which suggests that 
relationships need not be sexual but should be “intimate and personal.” One 
commentator at least is of the opinion  that platonic friendships, and short, very 
intense relationships, will be excluded.24  Certainly, each case will need to be 
decided on its own particular facts and the courts should aim to reflect the 
contemporary reality of the diversity of intimate and personal encounters.  
Under the DVCVA common assault is now an arrestable offence. Section 
10(1) of the Act amends the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 Schedule 
22 ibid   paras 47- 49. 
23 Home Office, July 2003, para 38-50. 
24  Bessant  note 19 above.   
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1A, which now allows police to arrest in cases of common assault (the least 
serious of criminal assault offences), without obtaining a warrant, so that 
immediate protection for victims of domestic violence can be ensured.25 In 
1984, Sherman and Berk,26 in a research experiment where police were 
randomly assigned one of a number of responses (arrest, mediation, and 
removal from the scene) in minor domestic violence incidents, and then 
followed up these individual cases to assess the deterrent effect of the assigned 
response, concluded that “arrest is best” in deterring subsequent domestic 
incidents. The research was replicated in many American cities and a pro-arrest 
policy was considered to impact significantly on reducing repeat incidents of 
domestic violence. However, the Sherman and Berk experiments were also 
criticised for too readily concluding that the pro-arrest police response was the 
determining variable in deterring domestic violence repeat incidents. Critics 
were concerned that the decline in repeat incidents of domestic violence which 
characterised cases where the police response was one of arresting the suspect 
was an indicator not of a real decline in repeat violence but instead the 
consequence of victims simply not calling police on subsequent occasions. 
Despite this caveat, it is now widely accepted that, in the long-term endeavour 
of reducing domestic violence, police pro-arrest policies not only serve to 
remove the violent perpetrator but also convey an important symbolic message 
to individual perpetrators and to society that domestic violence is unacceptable.  
The implementation of a positive arrest policy in the DVCVA is reinforced 
by being included in the Policing Performance Assessment Framework27 
whereby police performance is measured by the percentage of cases where 
police make an arrest where they have the power to do so. Police forces in the 
UK have been considering how they will implement the new arrest provision. 
The Metropolitan police in London have stated: “The Met is committed to 
holding domestic violence offenders accountable and we will arrest given 
reasonable grounds.”28 Staffordshire Police have stated:  
 
“The onus will be on officers to make arrests where evidence 
of abuse is found and the power of arrest exists …from March 
1 2005 Staffordshire Police have been completing a detailed 
log in all domestic violence cases to which they are called. The 
log, known as DIAL (Domestic Investigation Arrest Log or, if 
there is no crime, Domestic Intelligence Assessment Log), will 
25 July 1, 2005  SI No.2005/1705. 
26 L.W. Sherman. and R.A. Berk, “The Specific Deterrent Effects of Arrest for 
Domestic Assault” (1984) American Sociological Review 49 (2): 261-72. 
27 http://police.homeoffice.gov.uk/performance-and-measurement/performance-
assessment/assessments-2004-2005/ 
28 http://www.met.police.uk/dv/ 
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include evidence and intelligence-gathering checklists. These 
will encourage officers to carry out tasks including 
photographing the victim or scene and seizing evidence such as 
mobile phones containing threatening text messages. The log 
will include victim and witness statements, removing the need 
for separate paperwork, and will give officers the chance to 
make an early risk assessment of an incident and a tailored 
safety plan for the victim.”29
 
However, it must be remembered that an arrest provision does not compel 
officers to arrest and whether police exercise their arrest power is a matter left 
to an individual officer’s discretion and what s/he consider reasonable grounds. 
Other protective measures in the DVCVA include the expansion in the use 
of a restraining order. Previously, restraining orders were only provided for 
under the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 (PFHA) section 5. This 
remedy is now part of the DVCVA (section 12(1)). Perhaps the most 
contentious aspect of this remedy is that such orders may be imposed even in 
cases where a person is acquitted of an offence. Section 12(5) inserts a new 
section 5A in the PFHA which provides: “(1) A court before which a person 
(‘the defendant’) is acquitted of an offence may, if it considers it necessary to 
do so to protect a person from harassment by the defendant, make an order 
prohibiting the defendant from doing anything described in the order.” In the 
House of Lords debate on the Bill it was stated: “The government recognises 
that the amendment is wide, but believes it necessary to deal with those cases 
where there has been clear evidence during the proceedings that the victim 
needs protection, but insufficient evidence to convict.”30
The DVCVA (section 1) also makes a breach of a non-molestation order a 
criminal offence, carrying a maximum five-year prison sentence, thus 
addressing the ineffectiveness of the enforcement of civil provisions. In 2004,31 
20,890 non-molestation orders with a power of arrest were granted. Breaches 
of non-molestation orders were not taken seriously by the police or by the 
courts, few individuals were proceeded against for such breaches and sentences 
handed down by the courts were nominal.32 Whilst section 47 (2) b of the FLA, 
required a power of arrest to be attached to non-molestation orders, “unless 
satisfied that in all the circumstances of the case the applicant or child will be 
29 http://www.staffordshire.police.uk/news/2005/02_feb/news528.htm 
30 Hansard (HL) col GC,  February 2, 2004. 
31 Judicial Statistics 2004 (London: Department of Constitutional Affairs 2005) Cm 
6565, Table 5.10. 
32 See Odumosu v Aiyeola (Court of Appeal)  October 16, 1996; A-A v B-B [2001] 
2FLR 1; Lomas v Parle [2004] 1 WLR 1643; Aquilina v Acquilina [2004] EWCA Civ 
504; Bartley (t/a Lundy) v Wilson [2004] EWCA Civ 1338. 
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adequately protected without such a power of arrest” the enforcement 
mechanism where orders were breached still remained ineffective. In Robinson 
v Murray (2006), 33 the judge found that the defendant was guilty of three 
breaches of a non-molestation order, and sentenced him to eight months' 
imprisonment in respect of each breach, to be served concurrently. The 
defendant appealed contending that the sentence was manifestly excessive in 
the circumstances. The application was dismissed. 
 
A NEW KIND OF HOMICIDE  
 
The DVCVA   introduces a new offence in section 5(1) of “causing or 
allowing the death of a child or vulnerable person” where that person is a 
member of the same household, (household member being widely drafted). 
Section 5 (1) provides: 
 
“A person (‘D’) is guilty of an offence if - (a)a child or 
vulnerable adult (‘V’) dies as a result of the unlawful act of a 
person who- (i)was a member of the same household as V, and 
(ii) had frequent contact with him,(b)D was such a person at 
the time of that act, (c)at that time there was a significant risk 
of serious physical harm being caused to V by the unlawful act 
of such a person, and (d) either D was the person whose act 
caused V's death or - (i)D was, or ought to have been, aware of 
the risk mentioned in paragraph (c),(ii) D failed to take such 
steps as he could reasonably have been expected to take to 
protect V from the risk, and (iii) the act occurred in 
circumstances of the kind that D foresaw or ought to have 
foreseen. (2)The prosecution does not have to prove whether it 
is the first alternative in subsection (1)(d) or the second (sub-
paragraphs (i) to (iii)) that applies.”34
 
These inelegantly drafted paragraphs d(i) to (iii) are to be read 
conjunctively. The Home Office Circular,35 in its description of the offence, is 
somewhat clearer:  
 
“The offence provides that members of a household who have 
frequent contact with a child or vulnerable adult will be guilty 
33 [2006] 1 FLR 365. 
34 Sections 5 to 8  in force   March 21, 2005,  SI 2005/579. 
35 Home Office Circular 9/2005  The Domestic Violence and Victims Act 2004:The new 
Offence of causing the death of a child or vulnerable adult,  04/03/2005, (London: 
Home Office 2005). 
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if they caused the death of that child or vulnerable adult or 
three conditions are met: they were aware or ought to have 
been aware that the victim was at significant risk of serious 
physical harm from a member of the household; and they 
failed to take reasonable steps to prevent that person coming to 
harm; and the person subsequently died from the unlawful act 
of a member of the household in circumstances that the 
defendant foresaw or ought to have foreseen.” 
 
The person must be a member of the same household as the child. 
Although this is to be interpreted loosely and does not require the party to live 
in the same household, it does, however, require the party to be a regular 
visitor, so as to include boyfriends who may not cohabit but visit on a regular 
basis. This provision is designed to address the difficulty which has presented 
the prosecution for some time exemplified in R v Lane and Another (1985),36 
where the Court of Appeal held that where it could not be established which of 
two defendants  (in this case a mother and stepfather) were responsible for the 
death of a 22-month-old baby, then the convictions for manslaughter should be 
quashed.  James and Linda Lane were found guilty of manslaughter at Cardiff 
Crown Court after their daughter died from a single blow to the skull. The 
prosecution conceded that the evidence did not establish which of the 
appellants had inflicted the injuries but invited the jury to draw the inference 
that both were jointly responsible. At the end of the prosecution case the 
defence made an application of “no case to answer.” The judge rejected the 
defence submission stating that he was satisfied that there was sufficient prima 
facie evidence on which the jury could conclude that both had been responsible 
for the death of the child. As a result the jury convicted. On appeal, the 
convictions for manslaughter were quashed on the basis that the trial judge 
ought to have ruled in favour of the appellants on their submission of “no case 
to answer” because it could not be established which of the two defendants 
caused the fatal injuries  “…import[ing] into the law relating to proof of 
manslaughter a new test - converting the general responsibility for custody and 
care into actual presence at the time the blow was struck, even though on the 
acknowledged facts there were substantial periods when only one of the 
appellants was present” (see also R v Aston and Another (1991)).37 Where both 
parties made explicit denials, this difficulty in establishing criminal liability for 
one of the two parties persisted.  Although in R v Russell and Another (1987),38 
where the appellants A and M were registered drug addicts, in receipt of daily 
prescriptions of methadone, which they obtained in liquid form and made 
36 [1985] 82 Cr App Rep 5. 
37 [1991] Crim LR 701. 
38 [1987] Crim LR 494. 
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admissions that “on occasion” they had dipped the child’s dummy into the 
liquid methadone to placate her while she was teething, a conviction for 
manslaughter followed.  
In cases where both parties deny the offence and make no inculpatory 
statements the judge must direct “no case to answer” on manslaughter or 
murder if the prosecution cannot establish that there is a case to answer against 
either defendant. Lord Lane CJ  in Galbraith (1981)39 said: 
 
“(1) If there is no evidence that the crime alleged has been 
committed by the defendant, there is no difficulty. The judge 
will of course stop the case. (2) The difficulty arises where 
there is some evidence but it is of a tenuous character, for 
example because of inherent weakness or vagueness or 
because it is inconsistent with other evidence. (a) Where the 
judge comes to the conclusion that the prosecution evidence, 
taken at its highest, is such that a jury properly directed could 
not properly convict upon it, it is his duty, upon a submission 
being made, to stop the case. (b) Where however the 
prosecution evidence is such that its strength or weakness 
depends on the view to be taken of a witness's reliability, or 
other matters which are generally speaking within the province 
of the jury and where on one possible view of the facts there is 
evidence upon which a jury could properly come to the 
conclusion that the defendant is guilty, then the judge should 
allow the matter to be tried by the jury...” 40
 
In 2003, the Law Commission issued a consultation document followed by 
a report outlining their concern  that co-accused’s  could and did evade 
conviction in such circumstances.41 Whilst the new provision in the DVCVA 
addresses this problem in the legislation, there is a concern that the provision 
may in fact be too broad. The “ought to have foreseen the risk” element 
embodies an objective test, which is contrary to the test for criminal liability in   
recklessness,42 which following R v G 43 is subjective. (However two of their 
39 [1981] 1 WLR 1039 at p.1042B–D. 
40 See also Bellman [1989] AC 836 at p. 849A, S [1996] Crim LR 346. 
41 Law Commission, Children: Their Non-accidental Death or Serious Injury 
(Criminal trials) A Consultative Report, Law Com No 279, April 2003; Law Com 
Report No 282. The full report is available on the internet at www.lawcom.gov.uk. 
42 Recklessness following Metropolitan Police Commissioner v Caldwell [1982] AC 
341, established broadly that for offences relating to personal injury the test was a 
subjective one, ie, “did the D foresee?” whilst for offences against property, for 
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Lordships in G, notably, Lord Bingham and Lord Rodger, considered it 
possible that recklessness could have different meanings in relation to different 
offences). The objective standard of  “ought to have foreseen” in the DVCVA 
is  also found in Osman44 where the ambit of art 2 of the European Convention 
on Human Rights  – right to life –  is articulated with regard to public authority 
liability, making  public authorities  liable  for failure to protect an individual’s 
“right to life” if  “they knew of a risk to an individual or ought to have known”, 
that such a risk existed. The formulation of an objective test which is a higher 
standard than a subjective test   is clearly driven by the difficulties presenting 
the prosecution in cases where two parties blame each other for the death of a 
child or where both simply deny that they did it.  
The DVCVA places a duty on the household member to protect the child or 
vulnerable person in line with the direction of the trial judge to the jury in Lane 
(cited above) where the judge deemed responsible those who have care and 
custody of the child, although at the time this direction was held by the Court 
of Appeal to be a misdirection. An offence under section 5 neither seems to sit 
with the general principles on recklessness or gross negligence. The burden of 
proof is on the prosecution (section 5(1)(d)(ii)(a)), to prove that  D failed to 
take steps as he could reasonably have been expected to take to protect the 
victim. Bessant, for example, points out that in assessment of the element 
“foresaw or ought to have foreseen” the government do not envisage that a 
member of the household who could not have reasonably foreseen the risk 
would be caught by this offence. As Baronness Scotland observed: “For 
example, it may be that an elderly grandmother in the household was too 
confused to recognise and act on any sign of risk…”45  The Home Office 
Circular46 states: 
 
 “…Depending on the facts of the particular case the court may 
find that the defendant may have been too frightened to take 
some of the steps which in other circumstances might have 
been available to them…there may be limited steps which they 
could reasonably have taken in order to protect themselves, 
and even more limited steps which it would be reasonable for 
 
example, criminal damage, the test was an objective one ie, “would a reasonable person 
have foreseen?” It would appear that the test now is subjective.   
43 R v G and another, HL [2003] 4 All ER 765, has overruled Caldwell and re-asserted 
a subjective test requiring awareness of risk for offences of criminal damage. 
44 Osman v UK (Case 87/1997/871/1083), ECHR [1999] 1 FLR 193. 
45 Hansard, HL, col 1158, March  9, 2004, Baroness Scotland.  
46 Home Office Circular 9/2005  The Domestic Violence and Victims Act 2004: The 
new Offence of causing the death of a child or vulnerable adult,  04/03/2005, Home 
Office. 
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them to take to protect the child or vulnerable person who was 
at risk from violence… this offence is premised on a duty to 
protect the vulnerable person from harm. All members of the 
household who had frequent contact with the victim would 
have that duty. The fact that the defendant may be young…, 
feel intimidated or have suffered violence, will not in itself be 
conclusive evidence that it was reasonable for the defendant 
not to take any steps to protect the victim.”47  
 
It is important that prosecuting authorities and the courts recognise that in 
cases where children are abused female partners are also frequently assaulted 
by the perpetrator. Many mothers and female carers who are responsible for the 
care of  children and who  experience violence or the threat of violence  may be 
unable to take “reasonable steps” or else to recognise the risks to the child 
because of their own  fear and inability to act. The US case, People v Steinberg 
(1989)48, involving the death of Lisa Nussbaum the adopted daughter of Hedda 
Nussbaum, and the UK case R v Emery and Hedman (1972), involving the 
death of (Chanel Hedman) the daughter of Sally Emery and Brian Hedman, 
provide two clear examples where women  who were battered and terrorised by 
the perpetrator were unable to act to prevent the deaths of children in their care. 
In the US case,49 Lisa Nussbaum died of injuries to her head and body inflicted 
by Joel Steinberg, (Hedda Nussbaum’s cohabitant). Hedda Nussbaum herself 
sustained a wide range of chronic injuries over time, including a broken nose 
and gangrenous wounds including a ruptured spleen. In giving evidence for the 
prosecution she said she ate when permitted to do so, went to the bathroom 
when permitted to do so, and when asked  by the prosecution why she did not 
call an ambulance for Lisa when she knew that the child was dangerously ill, 
she said, “Joel told me he would get Lisa up and I didn’t want to show 
disrespect.”50 In the UK case R v Emery and Hedman 51 both parties were 
charged with assaulting 11 month old Chanel Hedman and with causing 
suffering to her. She was found to have 22 injuries, including 11 broken ribs. 
Neither was charged with her murder or manslaughter because the prosecution 
47 Home Office Circular 9/2005  The Domestic Violence and Victims Act 2004:The new 
Offence of causing the death of a child or vulnerable adult,  04/03/2005, Home Office 
para 18-24. 
48 The trial was held in 1989 and a video documentary made of the trial Inside Story On 
Trial transmitted by BBC1 June 7, 1989,  BBC Programme Number: LDFX410K. 
49 The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Joel Steinberg, Also Known as 
Joel Barnet Steinberg, Appellant No. 100 Court of Appeal of New York, 79 N.Y.2d 
673; 595 N.E.2d 845; 584 N.Y.S.2d 770; 1992 N.Y. Lexis 1590. 
50 People v Steinberg trial documentary see note 48. 
51 (Unreported)  November 3, 1992. 
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were unable to determine which of them inflicted the fatal injury. The court 
heard that Sally Emery, suffered from post-traumatic stress syndrome 
following repeated assaults from Hedman, and that she was in such fear that 
she was incapable of getting appropriate help and assistance for the child.52   
Both Hedda Nussbaum and Sally Emery were unable to take “reasonable 
steps” to prevent the abuse of the children in their care.  Such cases illustrate 
the problem under the DVCVA that may present the defence in establishing 
that a co-defendant could not take reasonable steps to protect. More recently 
the Ullah case53 illustrates the predicament of a mother’s inability to protect her 
child where a partner is violent. Sitab Ullah, was convicted of murder, he 
believed that his baby daughter was possessed, and battered and abused her. 
The child’s mother, Salma Begum, pleaded guilty to child neglect. She gave 
evidence from behind a screen, (following a special measures direction) and 
told the court how Ullah had said that Samira was not his child and was 
possessed by spirits.  “He didn't want me to feed her too much. He complained 
she was becoming greedy because he thought the thing inside her wanted to be 
fed all the time.” 54 She had on two occasions been re-housed because of the 
domestic violence she suffered.  Counsel, described her as a woman who 
showed the classic signs of being a battered wife unable to take reasonable 
steps to protect her child. The court sentenced her to 15 months imprisonment 
for child neglect.55 More recently Sandra Mujuru, was charged with failing to 
protect her daughter (section 5 DVCVA) her partner was convicted of 
murdering the child. Sandra Mujuru was described by the judge as a “decent 
young woman who was in a vulnerable position”56 and given a non-custodial 
sentence.  
A woman’s fear of the perpetrator may also prevent her from speaking 
about what has occurred. Prosecuting authorities and the courts should be open 
to this reality and it is here that an expert witness57 addressing the court on the 
effects of violence on the mother or carer might be of assistance to the court. 
52 Cited in R v Hurst [1995] 1 Cr App Rep 82.  
53 The Guardian,  December 23, 2005. 
54 The Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999, part II, chapter I (ss. 16 to 33) 
“fear or distress they are likely to suffer when giving evidence” (section 17). 
55 The Guardian, December 23, 2005.  
56 Express, May 6,  2006. 
57 In this context it is worth noting the public condemnation of mothers of child 
victims. In the US case against Gabriela Hernandez,- a Ventura County judge 
sentenced her to 11 years and told the 23-year-old he could not understand why she 
failed to stop her husband from beating her two year old daughter to death. The 2nd 
Appellate District Court overturned the 1998 conviction, saying that the Ventura 
County Superior Court judge in that trial should have allowed expert testimony on her 
being a battered wife. (Los Angeles Times, April 24, 2001). 
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The Law Commission, in its Report, emphasised that silence of itself should 
not inculpate in such circumstances, and said:  
 
“…where the evidence was such that the defendant was so 
close to the events that he or she must either have been the 
perpetrator, or been complicit in it, or be able, even if only by 
exculpatory evidence, to cast light on which other person was 
responsible for the child's death or injury, then the court may 
well conclude that the circumstances so called for an 
explanation from him or her, as a person with the statutory 
responsibility, that it would be proper to permit the jury to 
draw an adverse inference from the defendant's silence. In such 
a case the ‘eloquent silence’ of the defendant might be said to 
be the ‘decisive’ element in a decision to convict but it would 
not mean that the defendant was convicted ‘solely or mainly’ 
on an inference from silence any more than the ‘decisive’ 
straw is the ‘sole or main’ cause of the camel's broken back.”58  
 
Whilst section 6 of the DVCVA allows adverse inferences to be drawn 
from a failure to give evidence or a refusal to answer a question, it will be a 
matter for the judge whether a direction is appropriate:   
 
“6(1) Subsections (2) to (4) apply where a person (‘the 
defendant’) is charged in the same proceedings with an offence 
of murder or manslaughter and with an offence under section 5 
in respect of the same death (‘the section 5 offence’).(2)
 Where by virtue of section 35(3) of the Criminal 
Justice and Public Order Act 1994 (c. 33) a court or jury is 
permitted, in relation to the section 5 offence, to draw such 
inferences as appear proper from the defendant's failure to give 
evidence or refusal to answer a question, the court or jury may 
also draw such inferences in determining whether he is guilty-  
(a)  of murder or manslaughter, or 
(b) of any other offence of which he could lawfully be 
convicted on the charge of murder or manslaughter, even if 
there would otherwise be no case for him to answer in relation 
to that offence. 
(3) The charge of murder or manslaughter is not to be 
dismissed under paragraph 2 of Schedule 3 to the Crime and 
Disorder Act 1998 (c. 37) (unless the section 5 offence is 
58 See note 41 above, paras 6.86 and 6.87 of the Law Commission Report. 
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dismissed). (4) At the defendant's trial the question whether 
there is a case for the defendant to answer on the charge of 
murder or manslaughter is not to be considered before the 
close of all the evidence (or, if at some earlier time he ceases to 
be charged with the section 5 offence, before that earlier 
time).” 
 
The predicament for the battered woman in such circumstances is 
expressed by Bessant who asserts: “The result of section 5 and section 6 
together is to present an unenviable choice to the defendant: fail to give 
evidence, thereby risk adverse inferences and a prosecution on the section 5 
offence, or risk giving evidence which may bolster a weak prosecution case for 
murder or manslaughter” (sic).59 The position with regard to the drawing of 
adverse inference at trial is governed by R v Cowan60 where the Court of 
Appeal considered the effect of the section together with the specimen 
direction published by the Judicial Studies Board (JSB). The House of Lords in 
R v Becouarn61 upheld Cowan as good law. There is a further problem with 
section 5 which is that it is not necessary for the jury to reveal on what basis 
they are convicting either of the co-defendants.  So, a jury may return a guilty 
verdict on co-defendant A and co-defendant B, where they believe that 
defendant A caused the death and that defendant B allowed the death. A judge 
in sentencing faced with this scenario could sentence defendant B on the basis 
that s/he caused the killing of the child when in fact the jury did not believe this 
to be the case.  To avoid this an application for a special verdict to ascertain the 
basis of the jury’s verdict could be made. It would be essential in my view that 
such an application is made.62   (This section will require amendment to severe 
“causing” from “allowing” leaving “allowing” as an alternate charge). With 
regard to sentencing, the maximum penalty of 14 years or less for this offence63 
(which is less than the maximum for manslaughter and murder)64 is designed to 
59 Bessant note 19 above p.5. 
60 [1995] 4 All ER 939.  
61 [2005] UKHL 55: [2005] 4 All ER 673. 
62 For the importance of the use of special verdicts see Malhi [1994] Crim LR 755. See 
also the need where appropriate for a Newton hearing. A Newton hearing is where the 
D admits some facts of case but disputes others, or admits facts of case but disputes the 
charge. For example, a Newton hearing may be requested by the defence where D 
admits stealing a mobile phone from a person using it in the street and admits the facts 
(admitting to theft) but does not admit to a charge of robbery (which requires the 
additional element of fear or force).  The Newton hearing is considered a trial where 
the judge considers submissions before proceeding to sentence, see R v Newton [1983] 
Crim LR 198. 
63 DVCVA 2004 section 5 ss7. 
64 See Criminal Justice Act 2003, chapter seven, section 269. 
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induce one party to give evidence against the other. If both parties can be 
sentenced to up to a maximum of 14 years it may not be much of an 
inducement. 
   
RIGHTS - WHOSE RIGHTS? 
 
Finally, the trouble with domestic violence assaults perpetrated against 
adults is not only a question of substantive law but remains one of effective 
prosecution. Getting victims to court remains an intransigent problem largely 
because women are afraid to give evidence against perpetrators. The CJA 2003, 
section 116 provides for putting before a court a victim’s statement in place of 
her oral testimony, as one of the exceptions to hearsay, if: “…the court is 
satisfied that the case for excluding the statement, taking account of the danger 
that to admit it would result in undue waste of time, substantially outweighs the 
case for admitting it, taking account of the value of the evidence” (section 126 
(1)(b)).  
Applications by the prosecution to admit witness statements made to police 
are subject to defence objections that admission of such documentary evidence 
abrogates the fairness of the trial under art 6 (3)(d) of the European Convention 
of Human Rights (ECHR) since the witnesses evidence cannot be tested or the 
witness cross examined as to her evidence. There is very little jurisprudence on 
the specific circumstances prevailing in domestic violence cases on this point. 
However, the Strasbourg jurisprudence has established in several cases that the 
admission of a witness statement will not automatically be held to have 
contravened art 6 even if it is the sole evidence against the defendant.65 In any 
event, the question of whether the admission of a statement renders a trial 
unfair is a matter for national courts.66 This question was considered in the 
specific context of domestic violence in R (on the application of Robinson) v 
Sutton Coldfield Magistrates' Court,67 where an application for judicial review 
was dismissed on both grounds of the application. The first ground was that 
evidence of bad character had wrongly been admitted and the second ground 
that the defendant had been deprived of the opportunity to cross examine the 
witness as her statement was accepted in place of her attending court and 
giving evidence because she said she was in fear. 
More recently the Sentencing Guidelines Council68 has issued a 
Consultation Paper on Domestic Violence which proposes that the following  
65 R v Campbell, [2005] EWCA Crim 2078. 
66 R v Sellick v Sellick [2005] EWCA Crim 651, [2005] 1 WLR 3257.  
67 Queen's Bench Division (Divisional Court) [2006] EWHC 307 (Admin), 
CO/4926/2005, (Transcript: Smith Bernal Wordwave). 
68  Sentencing Guidelines Council Consultation Paper Overarching Principles: 
Domestic Violence. 
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aggravating and mitigating factors  should be taken into consideration  by 
sentencers. The aggravating factors include; the presence of children, the use of 
violence in contact arrangements made in respect of children, where the victim 
is particularly vulnerable, where there is a history of domestic violence, a 
history of breaching court orders and where the victim is forced to leave the 
home. Mitigating factors, they suggest, include the use of violence as an 
isolated incident, and good character. Although the SGC acknowledge that in 
such cases the offender may have two characters and good character outside the 
home should only be of minor relevance. The SGC also warn that sentencers 
should be wary of attempts by the defendant to suggest that the violence was 
provoked.  The SGC also suggests that the wishes of the victim should be 
treated with caution since there is a risk that a plea for mercy made by victims 
might be induced by the offender. As a general proviso the proposals stress that 
serious violence will warrant a custodial sentence. They also propose that 
where the offence has passed the custody threshold and a short custodial 
sentence is anticipated certain exceptions to custody  (in these cases) might be 
indicated where there is genuine remorse, where there is a real prospect of 
rehabilitation and reform, and where preservation of the relationship is 
intended. These are, as the proposals state, exceptions and the circumstances 
would need to be exceptional. The importance of these proposals in their effort 
to introduce some rationality into the sentencing decision has been 
misrepresented by the media which has failed to consider the proposals in 
context. It has been widely reported that the proposals are suggesting that a 
defendant who says he is “sorry” will evade a custodial sentence.69 It is 
important that the proposals in their entirety receive proper and full 
consideration in the effort to address the problem of domestic violence. 
69 Press reports were somewhat distorted suggesting that the guidelines were 
advocating non-custodial sentences for offenders who said “sorry.” The Times April 12, 
2006. 
 
